



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

pupil, are described, together with two regions from which increase or inhibition of respiration may be obtained respectively.

C. C. STEWART.

The World and the Individual. JOSIAH ROYCE. Gifford Lectures before the University of Aberdeen, N. Y. The Macmillan Co., 1900.

In this book Prof. Royce considers at length four historic ways of looking at being. The first three he analyzes and discards as either self-contradictory or inadequate, and then sets forth his own view of reality, a form of absolute idealism essentially the same as that reached in his previous treatments of the ontological problem.

The first takes up realism, both in its extreme form and as modified by a partial recognition of the idealistic standpoint; but he concludes that this view in either case cannot stand, since it separates irreparably the idea and its object, thus leaving two unrelated entities. For the second way of looking at reality, namely from the standpoint of mysticism, Prof. Royce has more sympathy, since this view "is from the outset reflective and founded on an appeal to experience." It is, however, by simply denying the finite that mysticism reaches the infinite, and like realism this second way of defining being is an abstraction and must be discarded. The third conception of being is set forth by critical rationalism, which defines reality as validity, truth, the standard of ideas. This conception Prof. Royce considers essentially true, but still inadequate, since it insists on too great a separation between the idea and its object. To bridge over this separation Prof. Royce advances his own point of view.

"Idea and object are related," he says, "because the object does not transcend the idea, and always in the last analysis is idea." More specifically the relation rests in the fact that the idea wills its object, and 'the will in question is the will that the ideas embody.' It is not the mere individual will and idea, however, that gives to us reality, since we know that individual wills are often opposed and that individual ideas are sometimes false. Final truth and final being are found in the absolute, whose existence is certain, since truth is certain. Prof. Royce answers the objection that experience is the only test for truth by saying that he perfectly agrees with this proposition, but he then defines experience in purely ideal terms, thus leaving here no basis for a realistic philosophy.

In asking the question, has Prof. Royce satisfactorily established his contention as to the nature of ultimate reality, it may be proper to consider whether he is justified in asserting that realism separates completely the idea and its object. Might not the realist reply to this objection that the true idea and its object are connected by the law of causality, the most real and fundamental of all relations? Further, is the assumption that Prof. Royce makes that we can never transcend the idea capable of proof. It is true that any statement concerning the idea or its object must be in ideal terms; but does it follow from this that the object is thus of necessity ideal. And finally, in bringing the conception of the will into his philosophy has not Prof. Royce gone beyond pure idealism? Can the will be completely explained from an ideational standpoint? does it not transcend even consciousness, and is not here a realistic basis to Prof. Royce's idealism?

S. S. COLVIN.